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enterprises’ (MNEs) foreign ownership, there is a limited focus on the role of host country human rights 
records on MNEs’ ownership decisions. Further, there is little understanding of the differences in 
ownership decisions between the developed country multinational enterprises (DMNEs) and emerging-
market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) as influenced by the non-market context of their host 
countries. This study, therefore, explores the links between the host country’s human rights governance 
and MNEs’ ownership strategy in cross-border acquisitions. We argue that clarity in human rights 
governance in the host country will encourage MNEs to establish higher stakes in local targets and that 
this relationship will be stronger for DMNEs than for EMNEs. Our findings, which support these 
hypotheses, offer insights into the relationship between MNE investment strategy and human rights 
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1. Introduction  
With growing concerns from governments and civil society about the enforcement of 
fundamental human rights, multinational enterprises (MNEs) increasingly face new societal demands 
(Kolk, 2016). These developments have given rise to studies on the non-market environment of 
international business, which considers the impact of issues such as climate change, child labor and 
access to health on global and local MNE strategies (Doh & Lucea, 2013). Much of the research on 
MNEs and human rights is concerned with intra-organizational policies and MNE misconduct, 
particularly in developing countries (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Yet, in contrast to the considerable 
amount of literature on MNE strategy and host country corruption prevalence (Collins, Uhlenbruck & 
Rodriguez, 2009; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006), studies examining similar effects of the human rights context 
remain sparse (Giuliani & Macchi, 2014; Wettstein, Giuliani, Santangelo & Stahl, 2019). In this paper, 
we consider human rights as one of the societal concerns which can influence internationalizing firms’ 
ownership strategy.  
Human rights have been in the spotlight in recent decades, with the efforts of social movements 
and global governance initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, or the Corporate Human Rights 
Benchmark. By directly engaging with businesses, they are increasingly drawing the attention of 
managers to local human rights concerns (Garriga, 2016; Maggioni, Santangelo & Koymen-Ozer, 2019; 
Orentlicher & Gelatt, 1993; Spar, 1998). As a result, a number of scholars have recently argued for the 
need to understand how MNEs from both developed and developing markets, engage with human rights 
issues in their foreign operations (Giuliani, Santangelo & Wettstein, 2016; Wettstein et al., 2019). Our 
study focuses on how the under-researched area of human rights as one of the dimensions of the non-
market environment within a country, impacts strategic choice in ownership by MNEs, and whether 
there is a difference between the strategic choice in ownership adopted by the developed country 
multinational enterprises (DMNEs) and that of emerging-market multinational enterprises (EMNEs).  
Ownership decisions require “significant resource commitments, including managerial 
expertise and coordination time, and, once established, have long-term consequences for the company” 
(Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016: 4225). Hence, in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, investors 
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have been shown to adjust the extent of control in target companies in response to the challenges posed 
by the host country environment and the associated strategic and operational considerations (Anderson 
& Gatignon, 1986; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh & Eden, 2006). Our baseline assertion is that MNEs 
will acquire higher ownership stakes in host countries with clarity in the human rights governance as 
this helps managers align their strategies with the local human rights concerns effectively, thus reducing 
uncertainty regarding potential future challenges to their foreign operations.  
At the same time, it is crucial to consider the role of the MNEs’ home country context as there 
is an inherent difference between the MNEs that originate from the developed markets as compared to 
those from the emerging markets that generally develop from locations where non-market environment 
is comparatively volatile (Cuervo-Cazurra, Luo, Ramamurti & Ang, 2018; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). 
We argue that these dissimilar home country contexts will likely be associated with differences in, not 
only strategic aspirations (Buckley, 2018), but also stakeholder expectations and capabilities to deal 
with challenges in the non-market environment which, in turn, have implications for their 
internationalization strategies. Many of EMNEs’ home countries are characterised by limited 
development and implementation of human rights governance, and they might lack both experience and 
external credibility in engaging with human rights practices (Fiaschi, Giuliani & Nieri, 2017). Yet, these 
aspirant EMNEs have proactively engaged in catch-up activities (Liou & Rao-Nicholson, 2019; Luo & 
Tung, 2007), including building their skills and targeting countries with good governance (Deng & 
Yang, 2015; Han, Liu, Gao & Ghauri, 2018). Similar to views presented by Chikhouni, Edwards and 
Farashahi (2017), we therefore propose that since prior understanding of internationalization and 
ownership have largely been derived from studies on DMNEs, when considering the role of the non-
market environment in MNE ownership decisions, it is useful to adopt a comparative approach that is 
sensitive to potential differences between the strategies of EMNEs and DMNEs. Specifically, we expect 
that EMNEs will be less deterred by challenges in human rights governance than their DMNE 
counterparts.  
To test our hypotheses regarding the influence of human rights governance in the host country 
on ownership decisions, we use a matched sample of 2802 deals conducted by DMNEs and EMNEs in 
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79 target destinations. The findings of our study contribute to two streams of literature. Our main 
contribution is to the debate on the role of the non-market environment in strategic choices made by 
MNEs (Di Guardo et al., 2016; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), namely the role of host country human rights 
regimes in MNE ownership strategies. By examining this relationship, we contribute to the emergent 
literature on the complex relationship between MNEs and human rights (Hsieh, 2015; Sullivan, 2017; 
Wettstein et al., 2019) where evidence remains largely anecdotal, and the broader debate on the links 
between MNEs and the non-market context of their activities (Puck, Lawton & Mohr, 2018). The results 
of our study show that the non-market environment within a host country, specifically human rights 
governance, has a significant impact on the ownership levels adopted by the MNEs. We show that firms 
prefer countries with better human rights governance when it comes to acquiring higher stakes in their 
targets.  
Secondly, our study supports the view that there is a need to further qualify the discussion of 
the non-market environment implications for MNEs (Voinea & van Kranenburg, 2018) by considering 
the appeal of better human rights governance to DMNEs and EMNEs. We extend the studies of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by MNEs and especially comparative work examining FDI strategies of 
DMNEs and EMNEs informed by the non-market environment (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Gaffney, Karst 
& Clampit, 2016; Malhotra, Lin & Farrell, 2016) by explicating how host country context and home 
country conditions combine to influence the strategic choices of these firms. By focusing on host 
country human rights governance as a source of challenges for MNEs, we add a further nuanced view 
on how DMNEs and late-internationalizing EMNEs perceive environmental challenges in host 
countries. Our findings show that human rights governance is of higher salience to DMNEs as compared 
to EMNEs, thus indicating that DMNEs are particularly reluctant to engage in host countries with 
potentially more challenging non-market environments. Importantly, however, we find that although to 
a lesser extent, human rights governance considerations are nevertheless also noteworthy to EMNE 
investors. These results, therefore, inform the debate on the differences between internationalization 
strategies of EMNEs and DMNEs (Chikhouni et al., 2017; Estrin, Meyer & Pelletier, 2018) and draw 
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our attention to the idea of potential convergence between the EMNEs’ and DMNEs’ approach to 
dealing with host country human rights.  
2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development  
2.1. Host country non-market environment, human rights governance, and MNEs 
According to Baron (1995: 47-48), the non-market environment spans “the social, political and legal 
arrangements that structure the firm’s interactions outside of, and in conjunction with, markets.”  Our 
understanding of the non-market environment is informed by institutional theory, according to which 
these arrangements can be conceptualised as encapsulated in formal and informal institutions  (De Villa, 
Rajwani & Lawton, 2015), the “humanly devised constraints” or “the rules of the game in a society” 
(North, 1990: 3). Whereas formal rules consist of codified rules and regulations, informal institutions 
include unwritten rules such as values, beliefs, norms and behaviors (ibid). Both formal and informal 
institutional environments can pose substantive challenges to MNEs, particularly at the point of entry 
when investors are less familiar with the local context (Slangen & van Tulder, 2009), and institutions 
might therefore affect investors’ risk perceptions (De Villa et al., 2015). Although political risk, policy 
instability and regulatory constraints on market transactions are a well-studied area of international 
business (Delios & Henisz, 2003), studies of the non-market environment and its implications for MNEs 
have focused on a relatively narrow set of issues (Doh & Lucea, 2013; Voinea & van Kranenburg, 
2018). The majority of these insights into the role of non-market context in MNE strategy comes from 
the work on corruption (Duanmu, 2011; Karhunen & Ledyaeva, 2012). As such, there is a gap in the 
literature on other non-market factors that might influence the MNEs’ internationalization activities 
(Voinea & van Kranenburg, 2018). We propose human rights governance in the host country to be one 
such issue. 
 Ang and colleagues (2015) considered human rights in aggregate, as a subset of governance 
matters, alongside civil rights, political stability and law enforcement. They suggest that this group of 
institutions is, in fact, not always explicitly codified and thus can also represent a challenge in cross-
border business transactions. From a more fine-grained perspective, as a dimension of non-market 
environment, human rights typically encompass a host of physical integrity rights (such as freedom 
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from politically-motivated imprisonment, murders and torture) as well as civil and political liberties 
(including the ability to freely practice religion, travel within and outside the country and participate in 
politics and union activities), the respect for which differs across states (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010; 
Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, 2001). Viewed in this way, human rights can be conceptualised as realized 
in practices espoused by the host governments.   
Challenges related to the human rights governance in the host country can arise from the lack of 
formalization of social issues as such, or the poor alignment between formal and informal institutions 
(Liedong & Frynas, 2018; Sen, 2007). Indeed, some aspects of human rights can well be codified into 
national laws (i.e. in the case of states ratifying human rights treaties and covenants and translating 
them into national laws or formal rules), but the state of a particular host country may not be willing or 
able to ensure respect of these laws (as suggested by the informal, unwritten rules). For investors and 
local actors alike, these differences between human rights, as codified in policy and realized in practice, 
might then represent deviations from the written rules and regulations within the host country (Simons 
& Macklin, 2014). The other scenario would be that human rights are not even codified into national 
laws (e.g., the state has not ratified certain human rights treaties, or it has ratified them but failed to 
transform them into national legislation afterward). Indeed, both situations would lead to weaknesses 
in the capacity of governments to ensure respect and promotion of certain human rights: from non-
existent observance in the case of no ratification or no national laws, to inadequate observance in the 
case of informal and formal rules being misaligned. Previous works have also argued that infringements 
of human rights by the state are often an indicator of a broader set of governance failures which deter 
foreign investors by posing social and economic risks to MNE operations (Arregle, Miller, Hitt & 
Beamish, 2013; Blanton & Blanton, 2007). 
Notably, international business studies concerned with human rights implications for MNE 
conduct have predominantly looked inside the MNE, examining global corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) practices and their local adaptation, or human rights reporting (Kolk, 2005; Kolk & Lenfant, 
2010; Obara & Peattie, 2018; Wettstein, 2012). As such, understanding how businesses respond to 
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human rights governance remains “perhaps the central impetus for the BHR [business and human rights] 
discussion” (Wettstein et al., 2019: 58). 
2.2. Non-market environment, human rights governance and MNE ownership 
When engaging in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, firms are driven by the goal of creating value 
(Xie, Reddy & Liang, 2017). Successful deals can open new market opportunities for companies and 
allow them to more effectively leverage their capabilities as well as acquire new ones. At the same time, 
cross-border transactions involve a high degree of risk, hence associated costs, which managers weigh 
against opportunities presented by the deal (Chari & Chang, 2009). Decisions about corporate control 
represent a major consideration in this process. When entering a new country through mergers and 
acquisitions, firms can mitigate against the risks associated with engaging with an unfamiliar context 
by pursuing a higher degree of control in the target company or by sharing the risk with a partner (Kedia 
& Bilgili, 2015; Xie et al., 2017). Greater degrees of control generally represent a higher commitment 
which exposes investors to more risks and limits the extent of investment reversibility. However, it also 
potentially generates greater value for the acquirer by providing access to organizational knowledge, 
experience and human capital (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Erramilli, Agarwal & Dev, 2002). On the 
other hand, reducing the degree of control enables investors to share risks with partners and maintain a 
degree of flexibility to reverse the investment (Ahsan & Musteen, 2011).  
 Extant research provides limited reflection on how human rights within a country will impact 
MNE ownership strategy. Indeed, much of the insights on the role of non-market context considerations 
and ownership choice come from the work on other non-market issues such as political interference, 
political risk and corruption. These studies nevertheless offer insights into the non-market context 
considerations in cross-border investments by suggesting that MNEs adopt a conservative approach to 
ownership when they are faced with considerable challenges in the non-market environment. For 
example, starting with Kobrin (1979), research has highlighted the implications of the non-market 
environment for MNEs’ operation and performance. Demirbag and colleagues (2007) have argued that 
in the context of political risk, MNEs will pursue lower equity stakes in their foreign affiliates. 
Similarly, Demirbag, McGuinness and Altay (2010) show that perceptions of challenging host country 
 8
ethical and societal issues such as corruption, bribery, business ethics, law and order challenges, 
including the existence of illegal groups, will lead MNEs to acquire lower stakes in their foreign 
operations. Research on corruption has produced mixed results, suggesting that arbitrariness, rather than 
mere prevalence of corruption, is likely to lead to an unpredictable context for investment. Although 
MNEs may experience additional costs of operating in highly corrupt environments, these settings 
generally have more predictable rules that enable MNEs to cope with the non-market context, whereas 
arbitrary corruption is much more difficult to anticipate and therefore to address (Petrou & Thanos, 
2014). For instance, Wei (1997, 2000) has argued that pervasiveness of arbitrary corruption in the host 
environment reduces MNEs’ investment in such countries, and Uhlenbruck and colleagues (2006) 
found that issues stemming from arbitrariness of host country corruption will lead to MNEs sacrificing 
a higher degree of ownership in a cross-border deal in favor of reducing corruption pressures.  
Poor human rights governance, similarly, may serve as another important and distinct source 
of non-market challenges for foreign investors by directly or indirectly affecting their operations and/or 
signaling broader governance challenges within the local context. Some of the earlier works theorized 
that pervasive suppression of human rights, such as collective bargaining, may appear to create 
predictably stable, thus favorable, conditions for FDI (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). However, recent 
evidence suggests that allegations of human rights abuse or condoning human rights violations in 
countries of operation, have negative implications for MNEs’ global activities (Fiaschi et al., 2017). 
Thanks to the increased level of transparency and speed with which such information now reaches 
relevant stakeholders – for instance through naming and shaming of complicit companies, and indeed 
countries, by NGOs (Blanton & Blanton, 2007) – MNEs are likely to be mindful of poor human rights 
in some countries and the implications of engaging with such contexts for their global footprint (Fiaschi 
et al., 2017). 
Weak human rights governance implies the need for investors to consider the associated 
strategic and operational challenges, such as barriers to the use of local human capital and the potential 
need to put in place policies and procedures to minimize safety hazards (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015). 
Further, as an indicator of poor governance, human rights abuses may be a signal or a precursor to 
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greater instability which may be caused by the erratic behavior of oppressive governments, or erupt in 
response to such regimes (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). For instance, Walsh and Piazza (2010) argue that 
physical rights abuses by the government incite domestic terrorism by creating tensions among political 
factions in the country as well as between the government and the general population, but also by 
undermining the willingness of the international community to collaborate with such states. These 
factors contribute to daily operational risks and in the long term undermine economic prospects for 
cross-border operations. Furthermore, firms are increasingly held accountable for allying with 
repressive governments through silent complicity that involves ignoring human rights abuses and 
indirectly supporting these regimes by generating revenue through tax payments and investments 
(Clapham & Jerbi, 2002; Wettstein, 2010). Such associations can not only tarnish foreign investors’ 
brands but also lead to consumer boycotts and various forms of disruptive backlash that can similarly 
undermine revenue streams and pose ongoing operational difficulties for MNEs in those countries 
(Vadlamannati, Janz & Berntsen, 2018). Preventing civil liabilities in such contexts may involve 
investing significant resources in enforcing self-regulation and internal human rights commitments.  
Additionally, poor human rights governance can create impediments for MNEs to acquire 
knowledge and skills or integrate their home country activities in their subsidiaries (Ai & Tan, 2018; 
Birkinshaw, Bresman & Nobel, 2010; Kedia, Gaffney & Clampit, 2012). To facilitate knowledge 
transfer between headquarters and subsidiaries, host countries would need to be open to immigration 
and emigration. Free movement of people in and out of the host country  (Cingranelli, Richards & Clay, 
2014), for example, can enable tacit knowledge transfer mechanisms by ensuring that expatriates can 
safely travel between the headquarters and the subsidiary. Tacit knowledge is relevant not only for high-
technology industries where information on technology and skills is exchanged between the parent 
company and the local unit (Elia & Santangelo, 2017), but it is also key in service industries where 
MNEs might be keen to learn customer management in the host country (Zheng, Wei, Zhang & Yang, 
2016). Access to an educated workforce also provides MNEs with opportunities to exploit highly skilled 
local human capital (Liou, Chao & Ellstrand, 2017). In this regard, government respect for human rights 
is salient as it is associated with higher levels of human capital development, which in turn is reflected 
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in greater life expectancy and higher levels of education (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). Finally, clarity in 
practices regarding labor empowerment and personal freedoms of citizens provides MNEs with clear 
direction for their integration strategy in the host country, especially while designing their human 
resource practices to fit with the local context. 
Based on the above discussion on the role of non-market environment in ownership decisions, 
it can be argued that MNEs would aim to acquire higher stakes in countries with better human rights 
governance, as it would instill greater confidence in investors regarding the predictability of the local 
context and its ability to support business objectives of MNEs. Accordingly, we put forward the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The higher the host country's human rights governance, the greater the MNEs’ investment 
in the cross-border targets.  
2.3. Integrating the role of the home country: comparing EMNEs and DMNEs 
To provide a more nuanced perspective on the relationship between MNE strategy and human 
rights, we also incorporate the role of the home country into our framework (Estrin et al., 2018). Earlier 
works (Chikhouni et al., 2017; Gammeltoft, Barnard & Madhok, 2010; Kaynak, Demirbag & Tatoglu, 
2007) have discussed the importance of considering the origin of MNEs in establishing their ownership 
strategy in foreign operations. Previous studies highlight the differences in the nature of institutional 
environments that EMNEs and DMNEs face back in their home countries, which in turn contribute to 
differences in their strategy and internationalization choices (Cuervo‐Cazurra & Genc, 2011; 
Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012). For instance, comparative work suggests that bidders from 
developed economies tend to be more cautious in cross-border deals involving considerable institutional 
differences than bidders from emerging economies (Gaffney et al., 2016). Cuervo‐Cazurra and Genc 
(2011), on the other hand, explicitly attribute the different stances of DMNEs and EMNEs towards 
challenges imposed by the non-market environment, to the differences in their home countries’ 
institutional environments.  
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MNEs from developed economies are argued to have been socialized into relatively stable 
institutional contexts, with well-developed formal institutions, including regulation of business conduct 
(Luo, Zhang & Bu, 2019), which pressure these firms to continually upgrade their non-market resources 
(Cuervo‐Cazurra & Genc, 2011). As such, they have been shown to be more likely to opt for higher 
commitments in contexts characterized by stronger institutional frameworks that promote societal 
interests (Choi, Lee & Shoham, 2016). In addition to robust governance, DMNEs’ home countries 
generally have a comparatively more vocal civil society, media and activist consumers who create 
stringent expectations for corporate conduct (Cuervo‐Cazurra & Genc, 2011). In some cases, these 
expectations can fully delegitimize the possibility of cooperating with countries whose governments are 
implicated in human rights abuses. Meyer and Thein (2014), for instance, document how, over the 
course of the Myanmar crisis, Western MNEs were pressured to leave or reduce their presence in the 
country. Non-governmental organizations in their domiciles leveraged home-country court systems and 
the aid of activist investors to put pressure on DMNE decision-makers. Those pressures were also 
amplified through boycotts organized by home country consumer groups. Similarly, during the 1980s, 
American companies curbed their operations in South Africa, which at the time was under the apartheid 
regime (Meznar, Nigh & Kwok, 1994). 
The non-market environment in emerging economies in particular, has been studied as a major 
factor affecting the internationalization decisions of foreign investors from developed economies into 
these locations (Luo et al., 2019). For example, DMNEs increasingly consider both operational and 
reputational costs associated with the local quality of labor standards (Brown, Deardorff & Stern, 2013). 
Maggioni and colleagues (2019) show how uneven labor standards drive sub-national location choices 
of DMNEs in Turkey. They propose that in developing market settings, the prevalence of informal 
institutions, uneven economic development, and weak regulations result in different degrees of 
unionization within the country. In such contexts, industrial relations would be underpinned by informal 
norms that may be difficult and costly to learn for outsiders, with strong unions deterring foreign firms 
from sectors with less reversibility. Elsewhere, scholars have also shown that DMNEs struggle to deal 
with less predictable political environments. Morck and colleagues (2008) documented the challenges 
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faced by a Canadian-owned firm in Kazakhstan which eventually left the country, unable to manage the 
threat of expropriation. Some researchers have also shown that legal and normative restrictions in home 
countries may constrain DMNEs’ ability to commit to settings characterized by non-market hazards, 
such as corruption (Tekin-Koru, 2006). 
Home country institutions of EMNEs, on the other hand, allow these firms to develop a certain 
set of non-market capabilities that puts them in a particularly strong position to deal with turbulent and 
risky settings (Morck et al., 2008) vis-à-vis DMNEs who emerge from more institutionally robust 
environments, by either developing the necessary resources without institutional support or learning to 
operate in their absence (Cuervo‐Cazurra & Genc, 2011; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012). 
Although this effect may not equally extend to all areas of local governance failure (Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Genc, 2008), EMNEs have been theorized to be comparatively less deterred by corruption, political 
instability or low government effectiveness, as they may have learned to manage these issues at home 
(Malhotra et al., 2016). Rabellotti (2014), for instance, points out that EMNEs from China have a 
propensity to invest in countries with weak institutions. Similarly, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) argue 
that MNEs’ engagement with weaker non-market environments, such as corruption, provides them with 
a learning opportunity which later enables them to handle equally challenging issues in other weaker 
institutional environments.  
Prior studies also suggest that EMNEs are attracted to contexts characterized by well-developed 
market institutions (Chari & Shaikh, 2017; Xie et al., 2017). Since they lack the ownership advantages 
possessed by DMNEs (Ramamurti, 2012), in their international expansion EMNEs are compelled by 
competitive pressures, limited prospects for growth in their domestic markets (Aulakh, 2007) and the 
need to catch up with their developed-market counterparts (Luo & Tung, 2007). Higher equity 
participation in targets based in these settings provides EMNEs with opportunities to rapidly access 
local competencies and knowledge (Gaffney et al., 2016). For example, in the absence of a strong rule 
of law at home, EMNEs have been compelled to invest heavily in markets with robust property rights 
enforcement and transparent business regulations (Chittoor, Sarkar, Ray & Aulakh, 2009; Cuervo-
Cazurra, Alvaro, Ramamurti, 2015). For instance, Deng and Yang (2015) find that more robust 
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governance attracts a larger number of acquisitions from emerging market investors. Liou and 
colleagues (2016) observe that EMNEs will seek higher ownership in foreign targets located in 
countries with substantially more advanced economies, which are also associated with well-developed 
institutions. Demirbag and co-authors' (2009) study of Turkish MNEs demonstrates that investments in 
developed economies will attract higher ownership in the target companies.  
Yet, research has shown that despite their aggressive acquisition strategies and attraction to 
well-developed institutions, EMNEs do face difficulties in such contexts, particularly in the non-market 
domain, stemming at least in part from their lack of experience with more stringent institutional 
environments, which would enable them to develop more sophisticated non-market resources and 
capabilities (Child & Marinova, 2014). For instance, unlike their developed-marked counterparts, EM 
firms are not always prepared to deal with strong labor rights in host countries, although they may 
attempt to address integration challenges post-entry (Khan, Wood, Tarba, Rao-Nicholson & He, 2018). 
Zhu, Zhu, and De Cieri (2014) found that Chinese firms fail to consider labor issues when expanding 
into advanced economies, prompting them to face challenges in these settings. Tellingly, Brazil’s Vale 
struggled with a union dispute when workers of Canadian Inco, its first major international acquisition, 
challenged the new owner’s compensation practices (Financial Times, 2010). Whereas DMNEs may 
have developed self-regulation in the form of codes of ethical conduct and corporate social 
responsibility which may reflect the expectations of contexts with more robust human rights 
governance, these practices are still relatively new to EMNEs (Marano, Tashman & Kostova, 2017). 
Thus, whilst there is evidence suggesting that EMNEs are attracted to good governance, particularly 
reflected in formal market-supporting institutions, the challenges that a more robust non-market 
environment imposes on these firms may temper their aspirations.   
 Although systematic comparative work on non-market institutions and internationalization 
strategies of DMNEs and EMNEs is limited (Xie et al., 2017), the above discussion provides indicative 
insights into their differences. In one of the few studies to explicitly employ such comparisons, Malhotra 
and colleagues (2010) compared the effects of host country corruption of cross-border deals of firms 
from China and the United States. Their findings show that although firms from both countries conduct 
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more deals in less corrupt markets, Chinese firms pursue greater commitment, reflected in deal value, 
in more corrupt economies. The authors reason that Chinese firms may require less effort to adapt to 
operating in such settings – indeed, commitment in those countries may for them represent a more 
favorable strategy of creating value from cross-border deals. In sum, we would expect EMNEs to be 
more adept than DMNEs at managing non-market uncertainty, such as that stemming from weak human 
rights governance in host countries.  
Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2. The effect of host country human rights governance on the MNEs’ investment in the cross-
border targets will be weaker for EMNEs than for DMNEs. 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
3. Methods and Data 
3.1. Sample and data collection  
This study focuses on fourteen large and small emerging economies, namely, Argentina, Brazil, 
India, China, Russia, South Africa, Indonesia, Poland, Turkey, Mexico, Thailand, Malaysia, United 
Arab Emirates and Chile, as deals from these countries have accounted for more than quarter of the 
global cross-border deals in recent years (UNCTAD, 2014). The data for this study was collected from 
SDC Platinum, which is provided by Thomson Reuters Financial Securities Data and consists of all 
completed deals conducted between 1995 and 2010. To exclude portfolio investments, following prior 
literature, we removed deals where the acquirers had taken less than 10% of the overall share in the 
target company (Liou et al., 2016). The deals without information on the deal value and ownership 
stakes were removed from the initial sample.  
3.2. Creation of a matched sample 
The matched sample procedure was chosen instead of considering all developed market deals 
as including all developed market deals would greatly bias the final sample since there are more deals 
from the developed countries as a whole (Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). Therefore, in this case, creating 
a matched sample provides a more efficient way of testing our hypothesis. We used US deals to proxy 
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developed market deals since the US is one of the most dynamic and active markets for mergers and 
acquisitions, including cross-border deals (Malhotra et al., 2016). For each emerging market deal in our 
sample, we located a US deal according to the following criteria. Firstly, the host country for the US 
deal needed to be the same as that of the emerging market deal, since host country conditions are the 
focus of this study. Secondly, we find the deals that occurred in the same announcement period, i.e., the 
one-year range around the announcement date. Thirdly, we match the remaining deals within the same 
bidder industry. Next, deals are gathered from the smallest difference in the deal value of both bidding 
firms. Our matching process revealed that US firms did not necessarily acquire in the same locations 
and industry during the same period as the emerging market companies, and we have 79 target 
destinations in the matched sample. Thus, along with accounting for missing values and unmatched 
deals, the sample was reduced to 2802 deals, where 1401 deals belonged to developed countries. The 
average values were close for both sub-samples indicating a good match between our samples: deal 
value ($198 million for emerging market companies and $199 million for developed market companies 
respectively) and past experience (0.49 and 0.39 respectively). The detail on the sampled acquirers and 
targets engaged in cross-border deals is presented in Table 1.  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
3.3. Dependent variable  
Ownership level, the dependent variable, consists of the equity stake that the acquirer has in the 
target firm after the acquisition. Table 2 provides details on the variables used in this study, and their 
measurement.  
[insert Table 2 about here] 
3.4. Independent variable 
The data on human rights protection within a host country is obtained from Cingranelli, 
Richards and Clay (2014). These include the Physical integrity rights index and Empowerment rights 
index. The Physical integrity rights index and Empowerment rights index were also added together to 
obtain a cumulative index for human rights within a country. The Physical integrity rights index is an 
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additive index consisting of four elements: Torture, Extrajudicial Killings, Political Imprisonments, and 
Disappearances (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). The Torture indicator measures the level of 
government-sanctioned mental and physical abuse, either initiated by the government or by private 
individuals. The Political Imprisonments indicator measures the level of incarceration of people due to 
their speech and non-violent opposition to governmental policies and leaders. The Extrajudicial Killings 
indicator measures the killings without the due process of the country's laws initiated by the government 
officials. Finally, the Disappearances indicator measures the level of disappearances within a state that 
is politically motivated. The four indicators take values between 0 (frequent occurrences), 1 (occasional 
occurrences), and 2 (no occurrences). 
In turn, the host country's Empowerment rights index consists of seven indicators: Foreign 
Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly and Association, 
Workers’ Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion (Richards et al., 2001). 
Foreign and Domestic Movement indicators measure the level of freedom for people to leave and enter 
their country and overall freedom of travel within their country. The Freedom of Speech index measures 
the degree of government censorship within a country, whereas, the Electoral Self-Determination index 
measures the extent to which the citizens enjoy political and electoral freedom. The Freedom of 
Assembly and Association is an overarching freedom index that looks at the level of liberty in a country 
regarding people’s rights to gather and engage in political and non-political activities. The index related 
to Workers’ Rights captures the degree of freedom for employees to organize themselves and participate 
in collective bargaining. Finally, the Freedom of Religion captures the extent to which the state protects 
citizens' freedom of religion. This index takes values between 0 (no government protection for the seven 
rights reflected in the indicators) to 14 (full government support for the seven rights).  
3.5. Control variables 
 Formal institutional distance is obtained from the Heritage Foundation and consists of the 
Index for Economic Freedom, which has been extensively used in extant studies to measure distances 
between the formal institutions in the home and host countries (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Liou et al., 2016). 
To obtain the formal institutional distance, the Index for Economic Freedom score of the home country 
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is subtracted from the Index of Economic Freedom score of the host country. For EMNEs’ acquisitions 
in the developed markets, this value will be positive, whereas it will be negative when buying in 
developing countries.  
The Cultural distance variable used in this study to control for any other social and normative 
factors has been widely employed to control for cultural issues in cross-border acquisitions (Ang et al., 
2015; Gaur, Delios & Singh, 2007; Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). In the main results, Hofstede’s 
methodology for assessing cultural values that were used in prior studies to measure the cultural distance 
between the two countries, was employed (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). This 
approach produces a score to indicate the absolute cultural difference between the host and home 
countries. 
Along with cultural distance between the two countries, we also control for several deal-, firm- 
and country-level characteristics. We control for industry relatedness of deals: Same industry is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 when both the acquirer and the target belong to the same industry 
(Liou, Rao-Nicholson & Sarpong, 2018). Extant works (Denis, Denis & Yost, 2002; Moeller & 
Schlingemann, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 2003) have highlighted the consolidation effects in 
acquisitions, and we control for this effect using a dummy variable. Deal value is the log value of the 
transaction (Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar & Chittoor, 2010; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). Cash 
variable indicates the payment method and takes value 1 if the acquisition was conducted through cash 
(and not equity) transfer. The payment mechanism has been noted to influence ownership stakes (King, 
Dalton, Daily & Covin, 2004; Lahiri, Elango & Kundu, 2014; Liou & Rao-Nicholson, 2017). 
Also, the acquirer’s past acquisition experience will impact their future acquisition strategy as 
they will be better able to anticipate and manage risks in international transactions (Lahiri et al., 2014; 
Liou et al., 2016). We control for this effect by including the variable Past experience in our model. 
We control for several country-level effects in our empirical model. The economic distance between 
the two countries, measured by the difference in their respective GDP per capita (GDP distance), is 
used to control for effects of differences in the level of economic development (Liou et al., 2018). 
Studies have suggested that minority shareholder protection in the host country can determine the 
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governance structure in cross-border deals and promote acquirers to claim full control during the 
acquisitions (Ferreira, Massa & Matos, 2010). Equally, minority shareholder protection can promote 
and enable the development of various supporting institutions in the country (Guillén & Capron, 2016). 
We create a Minority shareholder protection (HOST) variable which indicates the level of minority 
shareholder protection in the country (Guillén & Capron, 2016). 
We also control for the level of inward foreign direct investment (Inward foreign direct 
investment) in the host country as it might impel acquirers to gain a larger share in the targets to prevent 
their competitors from potentially mounting a hostile takeover or gaining access by exploiting low entry 
barriers (Kogut & Chang, 1991). Lastly, we control for various industry effects, country differences and 
year effects by including dummies for different sectors, countries and years. The industry dummies are 
created per the first two digits of the acquiring firms’ industry codes (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003). 
The descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of the dependent, independent, moderator and 
control variables are given in Table 2. Due to high levels of correlation between the two main variables, 
we do not use them in the same empirical model, and hence, our hypotheses are tested independently 
of the other factors utilized in this study. Following the initial analysis, we created the composite 
variable for human rights to test for the combined effects of their various individual elements. The data 
sources and variable descriptions are outlined in Table 3. 
 [insert Table 3 about here] 
1.1. Model and analysis 
The Tobit regression is used in the empirical analysis (Chari & Chang, 2009; Liou et al., 2016) due to 
the censored nature of our data as the stakes in the acquired companies range between 10-100%, and 
this method provides accurate estimates (Cuypers & Martin, 2010). Also, deals belonging to the same 
firm were clustered together using the cluster option in STATA software (Chari & Chang, 2009; Liou 
et al., 2016). The empirical model used in this study consists of the following variables: Yn, the 
dependent variable, Xi, the independent variable measuring the human rights value in the host country 
and Ck, which is the set of control variables. The empirical model, in general form, is shown below:  
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Yn =   + ∑  + ∑  	 + E 
Each empirical model with a single moderating factor and interaction term generates variance 
inflation factor (VIF) between 1-3, which are much below the accepted levels of 10 or above and 
which indicates the multicollinearity problems (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). 
4. Results  
Table 4 presents the results of our analysis. Columns 1-3 present the main results, and Columns 4-9 
present the results of our robustness analysis. The result in Column 1 presents the baseline analysis. 
The result in Column 2 shows the estimates for our first human rights index, namely, the Physical 
integrity rights index, and we observe that this estimate is positive and significant (β = 0.678, p>0.1). 
The result in Column 3 shows the estimates for our second human rights index, namely, the 
Empowerment rights index, and we observe that this estimate is positive though not significant. This 
supports Hypothesis 1. Similarly, the estimates presented in Column 4, which consists of a cumulative 
value for the human rights index, is positive but not significant, and we observe that the result for our 
human rights index obtained by principal component analysis is positive and significant.  
Next, we conduct two separate analyses for ownership measures. First, we use two levels for 
ownership, namely majority or not, and use Probit analysis to draw our estimates. We observe that our 
estimates presented in Columns 6-7 are similar to those presented as our main results. The second 
analysis consists of three ordered levels of ownership, full ownership, majority ownership and minority 
ownership, and we use an ordered Probit model to determine our estimates. The results obtained in 
Columns 8-9 show that these estimates for the human rights index are similar to those presented as our 
main results.   
[insert Table 4 and 5 about here] 
 Table 5 presents the results of our further robustness tests. In this case, we use two alternative 
measures of institutional distance, namely the financial distance and the property rights distance. We 
observe that the results of these robustness tests are similar to those presented in our main table. 
Furthermore, we conducted analysis with a control for ownership restriction, which has been recognized 
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among the factors influencing foreign ownership decisions (Kedia & Bilgili, 2015), where this was 
proxied by an indicator on Business Freedom from Economic Freedom Index, and our results were 
similar to those presented in this paper. 
 We used another measure for ownership restriction for which we obtained data from the World 
Bank. The World Bank provides aggregated information for ownership restrictions within a country 
where data is available at SIC 1-digit level (for example, Agriculture, Mining, Oil and Gas, and so on), 
and the data shows the Foreign ownership allowed in this aggregated sector, for example, in the 
Agriculture sector in the US it is 100%. This leads us to calculate the Ownership restriction measure as 
equal to 100 minus Foreign ownership allowed, and in the US Agriculture, it would be zero. We 
observed that with most countries there are few sectors which have restriction on ownership like Energy 
and Mining. The ownership restriction data is available for the year 2009, and given that we have data 
from 2000-2010 in this study, we conducted a sub-sample analysis using data for 2009-2010 and 
employing the Ownership restriction as a control in this model. The results of this analysis, which 
included 696 observations, are similar to those presented in the main analysis.   
 Amongst our control variables, we observe that some of these are significant in various models. 
Formal institutional distance is negative and significant in some of our models, and in others, cultural 
distance is negative and significant. The Same industry control variable is positive and significant in 
most of our models, suggesting a strong result for the consolidation effect in our analysis. This result 
suggests that MNEs are greatly influenced by consolidation strategies and acquire higher stakes when 
they target deals in their own industries. The Deal value has positive and significant value in all our 
models, thus suggesting a strong result for this variable in our study. This result indicates that the higher 
the deal value, the more likely the MNEs are to acquire a greater stake in their target. One rationale for 
this result could be that in deals with greater investment, MNEs are keen to gain a higher stake in their 
target to take ownership of the strategy process. Similarly, GDP distance is likely to lead to higher 
ownership. The Past experience, too, will indicate this ownership approach by MNEs. The levels of 
Minority shareholder protection (HOST) will lead to lower ownership by MNEs. Lastly, the inward 
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foreign direct investment will lead to MNEs acquiring higher stakes in their target, indicating further 
support to consolidation, especially global, for these firms. 
 Next, we conduct the analysis of our matched sample. We adopt the approach presented in 
Estrin et al. (2018), where the authors present a sub-sample analysis (firms from developed versus 
emerging markets) as well as a full model where the emerging market effect is demonstrated as an 
interaction effect. We observe that the coefficients for human rights indices are positive for both 
developed and emerging market firms, and in absolute values, the coefficient for developed markets is 
higher than that for emerging markets. The test of the difference of coefficients X2 reveals that 
differences in both human rights indices are significant at 1% (p = 0.000). Hypothesis 2 can also be 
tested by considering the sign and significance of the coefficient on the Emerging market x Physical 
integrity rights index and Emerging market x Empowerment rights index in the combined full model in 
Columns 5 and 6, respectively. It can be seen that the coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% 
level (p=0.000), indicating that physical integrity rights index and empowerment rights index effects 
are significantly smaller in the emerging market sub-sample. This further supports Hypothesis 2.   
[insert Table 6 and 7 about here] 
5. Discussion 
Although the recognition of the role of the non-market environment for MNE activities has long been 
a major theme in international business research, recent years have seen a particular interest in 
expanding on its implications. As Voinea and Kranenburg argue (2008: 730), “[d]espite managerial and 
academic acknowledgment of the importance of nonmarket institutions…their impacts on MNE 
behavior remain ambiguous”. This call is echoed by De Villa and colleagues (2015: 424) who suggest 
that it is particularly useful “to explore the non-market institutions…and their implications for market 
entry choices.” Motivated by recent debates on the relationship between international business and 
human rights, in this paper, we set out to contribute to this growing literature by examining whether 
human rights governance in the host country, as one underexplored dimension of the non-market 
environment, affects cross-border ownership strategies of MNEs. We conceptualized espoused host 
country human rights practices as sources of risk to MNEs’ global aspirations and a source of challenges 
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resulting from direct and indirect potential consequences to MNE operations. Our findings suggest that 
human rights governance has significant effects on ownership choices for MNEs, and that it matters 
comparatively more to DMNEs than EMNEs. We now turn to the key theoretical contributions of our 
study.   
We make our main theoretical contribution to the literature on non-market environment and its 
impact on strategic choices by MNEs (Doh & Lucea, 2013; Rodriguez et al., 2006; Uhlenbruck et al., 
2006; Maggioni et al., 2019), specifically the role of human rights regimes in host contexts. Slangen 
and van Tulder (2009) suggested that scholars need to measure the uncertainty embedded in the host 
country’s overall governance infrastructure, including its most important dimensions such as 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of corruption, and call for advancement of 
“our understanding of the role that governance dimensions other than political risk play in MNEs’ 
foreign entry strategies” (p.288). In this study, we demonstrate that it is indeed pertinent to examine the 
specific characteristics of the host country's non-market environment for MNE strategy, in addition to 
the implications, cultural and regulatory differences between home and host settings.  
With regard to human rights specifically, previous research on MNEs has considered them as 
a subset of regulatory institutions and/or democratic governance (Ang et al., 2015), whereas our 
approach is distinguished by considering human rights as realized in societal practices espoused by the 
state. Although we have drawn on extant research on MNEs’ non-market environment, which has to a 
large extent focused on issues of political risk and corruption, these institutional factors may affect 
investors’ perceptions of host country challenges distinctly from human rights governance. For instance, 
while human rights issues may be indicative of wider governance failures, policy risk is common to 
functioning democracies (Jensen, 2008). We therefore argue and demonstrate empirically that 
investment commitments of MNEs from both emerging and developed economies are likely to be 
affected by human rights governance considerations. It is indeed possible to argue that although foreign 
investors may with time learn to operate and even lobby home-country governments to relax restrictions 
on investment in settings characterized by pervasive corruption (Tekin-Koru, 2006), poor human rights 
governance represents a distinct set of substantive operational risks and considerably grave concerns 
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about the viability of leveraging the value of cross-border deals in these settings, and as an indicator of 
potentially wider systemic failure causes MNEs to consider their host country commitments with 
greater caution.  
Prior work has acknowledged that MNE home country influence contributes significantly to 
firm strategy, particularly in relation to non-market institutions (Puck et al., 2018). By comparing 
ownership strategies and governance considerations of MNEs from developed and emerging 
economies, our paper also contributes to the calls to compare international expansion strategies of 
DMNEs and EMNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Malhotra et al., 2016). An ongoing debate in the 
international business literature concerns whether EMNEs are similar to, or sufficiently distinct from, 
DMNEs to warrant novel theoretical frameworks that explain their strategies (Buckley et al., 2018; 
Hernandez & Guillén, 2018). Despite persistent theoretical questioning, however, comparative studies 
of EMNEs and DMNEs’ cross-border strategies have been rare and primarily focused on the 
implications of the host country market context (see Estrin et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2017). Employing a 
matched sample analysis of deals by the two groups of investors, we also extend the comparative work 
of scholars such as Malhotra and colleagues (2010). Our results lend support to the argument that 
EMNEs do differ in their internationalization strategies from DMNEs and suggest the need for a more 
nuanced and integrated perspective on the role of their home country contexts, the non-market 
capabilities that they help foster and the implications for these firms’ strategic choices in host countries 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Cuervo‐Cazurra & Genc, 2011). 
An important nuance of our findings, however, is that although EM investors are less sensitive 
to human rights governance in host countries, these issues nevertheless do have a significant impact on 
their cross-border deals. According to Giuliani and colleagues (2016, p. 635), the “key concern 
connected to the HR [human rights] conduct of EMNEs comes from considering the country of origin 
of these new players.” Yet, human rights are a highly politically sensitive and visible issue for 
companies and their stakeholders alike. Fiaschi and colleagues (2017) found that as EMNEs expand, 
they face heightened scrutiny and pressures to avoid human rights-related scandals. Our results, based 
on the data from EMNEs headquartered in fourteen countries, support this view and suggest that despite 
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various critiques and limitations imposed by their home-country weaknesses, there is indeed a “business 
case” for human rights respect (Blanton & Blanton, 2007; Vogel, 2005) from EMNE managers’ 
perspective. Although EMNEs appear to be less deterred by risks, as some of the extant works suggest 
(Buckley et al., 2018; Li, Quan, Stoian & Azar, 2018; Quer, Claver & Rienda, 2012), over time, through 
the process of internationalization we might expect these firms to become exposed to more societal 
expectations and to develop a more cautious approach to non-market risks.   
Despite our contributions, we are aware of several limitations which nevertheless open up 
exciting avenues for future research. First, due to the availability of data on human rights, we consider 
deals that took place between 1995 and 2011. Although the rapid growth of FDI from emerging markets 
is captured in this period (Fiaschi et al., 2017), we would encourage scholars to extend our analysis in 
future work as updated datasets become available. Second, we compared EMNEs with DMNEs from a 
single country. This approach has been used in previous studies (Malhotra et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2017). 
EMNE expansion is still in relatively early stages and this allows us to mitigate the disparity in the 
general number of acquisitions conducted by these firms and DMNEs. However, future work could 
extend this analysis to MNEs from other developed home countries. A framework drawing on 
comparative institutionalism (Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera & Smith, 2018; Jackson & Deeg, 2008) 
could be applied to multiple combinations of emerging and developed countries, as prior research has 
shown differences in stakeholder expectations for corporate responsibility and human rights respect 
(Rathert, 2016). Third, human rights represent an important facet of the host country institutional 
environment, but future research should also examine how these interact with other dimensions of 
governance. Fourth, future work could develop our findings further by investigating how different 
investment motives, such as strategic asset-seeking or natural resource-seeking, may impact the 
relationship between human rights and ownership propensity. The limitations of the data availability 
make it difficult to distinguish the type of investment in this study. Fifth, this study considers the host 
country human rights level and its influence on DMNEs’ and EMNEs’ strategies, and building on the 
framework and data sources employed in this research, future work can look at the distance between 
human rights in MNEs’ home and host countries. Similarly, studies can take a nuanced view of human 
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rights issues and assess the fine-grained effects of specific human rights issues in the host country. For 
example, human rights indicators in our study are made of several sub-indicators, and it would be 
interesting to examine which aspects matter relatively more to MNEs. Finally, guided by our aims, we 
selected a quantitative approach which, nevertheless, opens up a number of questions that need to be 
addressed through qualitative research. A fruitful way forward would involve interviewing MNE 
managers about human rights due diligence, now increasingly carried out during mergers and 
acquisitions, to examine how host country human rights governance might interact with corporate self-
regulation and the implications these interactions have for managerial decision-making.  
From a practical standpoint, our study also has implications for managers and policymakers. 
How corporations make investment decisions has important implications for home and host societies. 
Our findings suggest that robust human rights governance is attractive to investors from both developed 
and emerging markets. For policymakers, it might be particularly important to work with the civil 
society responsible for “spotlighting” different human rights regimes (Barry, Clay & Flynn, 2013) to 
ensure that investors are more acutely aware of the extent of human rights respect in potential 
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Deal value ($Mil) 
Malaysia 264 9% 65.58 
India 237 8% 93.9 
China 199 7% 203.79 
South Africa 160 6% 146.07 
Russia 104 4% 332.27 
United Arab Emirates 80 3% 751.89 
Brazil 64 2% 571.71 
Mexico 51 2% 491.66 
Thailand 64 2% 74.24 
Chile 49 2% 80.59 
Poland 54 2% 42.13 
Argentina 35 1% 120.29 
Turkey 19 1% 82.82 
Indonesia 21 1% 125.12 
United States 1401 50% 75.28 
Grand Total 2802 100%  
    
Acquirers’ industry    
Manufacturing 1278 46%  
Financials 496 18%  
Materials 220 8%  
Energy and Power 110 4%  
Services 148 5%  
Staples 304 11%  
Others 180 6%  
Construction 66 2%  
    
Target Country    
United Kingdom 296 11%  
Australia 286 10%  
Canada 140 5%  
Brazil 92 3%  
China 86 3%  
Argentina 84 3%  
Singapore 76 3%  
Hong Kong 72 3%  
Germany 68 2%  
India 64 2%  
    
Target market status    
Developed 1616 58%  
Emerging 1186 42%  
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Table 2. Variables, measures and data sources 
 Variable name Description/Measure Source 
Dependent 
variable 
Ownership Level Acquirer stakes in the target after the transaction.  SDC Platinum database 
Independent 
variable 
Physical integrity rights 
index, Empowerment rights 
index 
All indicators take values between 0 (frequent occurrences), 1 (occasional occurrences), and 2 (no occurrences). 
The composite host country human rights values range from 0 to 22. Physical integrity rights index ranges 
between 0 and 8, and Empowerment rights index range between 0 and 14. 
Cingranelli & Richards 
(1999), Cingranelli, Richards 





Ten economic freedom elements of each market are used to obtain the score difference between the acquiring 
firm’s home and target country. 
Heritage Foundation 
Cultural distances The cultural distance between the acquirer and target countries is calculated by using the power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, long term orientation, and indulgence.  
Hofstede website (2016) 
Same industry Measured using the four-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and target firms, and coded 1 when both firms have the 
same codes and 0 if otherwise. 
SDC Platinum database 
 
Deal value Log of the deal value 
Cash Coded as 1 if the transaction is in cash and 0 if otherwise. 
Government Ownership If acquirer majority-owned by a government agency, this is coded as 1 and 0 if otherwise. 
Past experience For acquirers with past cross-border experience, this is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Public target For the publicly-listed target, this variable is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
GDP distance The difference in the GDP per capita of the home and host countries. The World Bank 
Minority shareholder 
protection (HOST) 
Protection of the minority shareholders in the acquirer’s host country.  Guillén & Capron (2015) 
Minority shareholder 
protection (HOME) 
Protection of the minority shareholders in the acquirer’s home country.  
Inward foreign direct 
investment 
Inward foreign direct investment in the target country. The World Bank 
 




Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Sr. 
No. 
Variable Mean  Std.  
Dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Ownership Level 72.57 32.37 1.000            
                
2 Physical integrity rights index 5.16 2.56 0.092 1.000           
    ***            
3 Empowerment rights index 9.88 4.25 0.067 0.705 1.000          
    *** ***           
4 Formal institutional distance 13.11 9.66 -0.020 -0.178 -0.209 1.000         
     *** ***          
5 Cultural distance 64.24 31.18 -0.024 -0.204 -0.310 0.604 1.000        
     *** *** ***         
6 Same industry 0.46 0.49 0.085 -0.026 0.036 0.006 -0.030 1.000       
    ***  **          
7 Deal value 138.80 608.08 0.046 0.039 0.064 0.029 0.046 0.021 1.000      
    ** ** ***  **        
8 Cash 0.42 0.49 -0.009 -0.034 0.006 0.061 0.037 0.004 0.016 1.000     
     *  *** *        
9 Past experience 0.44 0.49 0.007 0.001 0.039 -0.041 -0.047 0.014 0.083 0.032 1.000    
      ** * **  *** *     
10 GDP distance 0.75 0.45 0.035 0.174 0.103 0.343 0.162 0.007 0.084 -0.052 -0.105 1.000   
    * *** *** *** ***  *** *** ***    
11 Minority shareholder protection (HOST) 6.23 1.02 -0.045 0.113 -0.093 0.044 -0.041 -0.011 0.018 -0.002 -0.038 0.077 1.000  
    ** *** *** ** **    * ***   
12 Inward foreign direct investment 40711.4 45630.6 0.110 0.088 0.074 -0.014 -0.064 0.007 0.068 -0.007 -0.047 0.052 0.257 1.000 
    *** *** ***  ***  ***  ** *** ***  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Results of the Regression Analysis for the Degree of Ownership in Cross-border acquisitions 
(columns 1-3) & Results of the Analysis using composite indices (columns 4-5) & two different 
classification of Ownership: one, Majority Ownership (0/1) analyzed using the Probit model, and two, 
Ordered Ownership Level (3/2/1) analyzed using the Ordered Probit model (columns 6-9) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 

















(0.191)    (0.008)  (0.007) 
Host Human Rights    0.210      
    (0.140)      





    
     (0.686)     
Formal institutional 
distance 












 (0.086) (0.090) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cultural distance 0.024 0.034 0.033 0.036 0.037 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000  











0.084 0.081 0.064 0.062 
 



















(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash 0.522 0.509 0.440 0.435 0.442 -0.020 -0.022 0.009 0.006  
(1.269) (1.267) (1.269) (1.268) (1.268) (0.057) (0.057) (0.047) (0.047) 
Past experience 1.037 0.971 0.974 0.953 0.950 0.020 0.019 0.039 0.038  











































(0.636) (0.636) (0.663) (0.656) (0.652) (0.032) (0.034) (0.025) (0.026) 




















(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 































0.113 0.0542   
 (12.38) (12.10) (11.86) (11.89) (12.34) (0.424) (0.446)   
Constant cut1        -0.237 -0.135 
        (0.454) (0.467) 
Constant cut2        0.507 0.609 
        (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,538 2,538 2,538 2,538 2,538 2,538 2,538 2,538 2,538 
Pseudo R-squared 0.220 0.220 0.220 0.0970 0.0971     
Log-Likelihood 
   
  -
1318.3










p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Two sub-indicators, Financial Freedom distance and Property Rights distance are used to 
examine the impact of institutional distance and human rights on the ownership  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Physical integrity rights index 0.874** 
 










Financial Freedom distance -0.0817* -0.0875**   
 (0.0427) (0.0433)   
Property Rights distance   -0.0519 -0.0319 
   (0.0447) (0.0434) 
Cultural distance 0.00134 -0.00447 0.0106 0.00620  
(0.0268) (0.0269) (0.0260) (0.0268) 
Same industry 2.628* 2.514* 2.625* 2.546*  
(1.348) (1.346) (1.352) (1.350) 
Deal value 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash 0.313 0.146 0.351 0.217  
(1.264) (1.265) (1.265) (1.267) 
Past experience 0.910 0.876 0.901 0.890  
(1.273) (1.276) (1.273) (1.277) 
GDP distance 19.59** 27.91*** 16.40 22.54**  
(9.796) (8.755) (10.04) (9.680) 
Minority shareholder protection (HOST) -1.946*** -1.762*** -1.804*** -1.682**  
(0.644) (0.668) (0.635) (0.662) 
Inward foreign direct investment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year, Industry, Country dummies Included Included Included Included 
Constant 63.94*** 56.41*** 64.06*** 58.20*** 
 (12.21) (12.10) (12.36) (12.40) 
Observations 2,538 2,538 2,538 2,538 
Pseudo R-squared 0.113 0.112 0.112 0.111 
p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Matched sample analysis of Developed (DM) and Emerging Market (EM) firms  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES DM EM DM EM Combined Combined 
Physical integrity 
rights index 
0.988* 0.938**   1.779***  
 (0.580) (0.432)   (0.345)  
Emerging Market X  
Physical integrity 
rights index 
    -1.084**  
     (0.535)  
Empowerment rights 
index 
  1.127*** 0.328  0.838*** 
   (0.370) (0.230)  (0.208) 
Emerging Market X 
Empowerment rights 
index 
     -0.795*** 
      (0.278) 
Formal institutional 
distance 
-0.334** -0.153 -0.240* -0.121 -0.201*** -0.128* 
 (0.138) (0.101) (0.142) (0.100) (0.0698) (0.0671) 
Deal value 0.0230*** 0.00289*** 0.0224*** 0.00295*** 0.00338*** 0.00344*** 
 (0.00538) (0.00109) (0.00538) (0.00111) (0.00117) (0.00119) 
Same industry 2.758 2.107 2.502 1.972 2.664** 2.490* 
 (1.922) (1.881) (1.915) (1.875) (1.347) (1.343) 
Cash -0.699 2.680 -0.693 2.627 0.0319 -0.307 
 (1.835) (1.758) (1.831) (1.760) (1.252) (1.255) 
Past experience -1.863 3.327* -2.018 3.359* 1.123 1.245 
 (1.793) (1.777) (1.790) (1.782) (1.266) (1.270) 
Cultural distance 0.111*** -0.166*** 0.190*** -0.165*** 0.0159 0.0214 
 (0.0352) (0.0422) (0.0479) (0.0427) (0.0239) (0.0249) 
GDP distance 147.1*** 21.74*** 147.4*** 24.60*** 12.13*** 13.00*** 
 (49.54) (5.901) (41.22) (5.667) (3.958) (3.853) 
Minority shareholder 
protection (HOST) 
-1.842** -2.097** -0.783 -1.955** -1.687*** -1.385** 
 (0.906) (0.893) (0.981) (0.921) (0.618) (0.640) 
Inward foreign direct 
investment 
9.62e-05*** 0.000103*** 9.83e-05*** 0.000101*** 9.46e-05*** 9.24e-05*** 
 (2.25e-05) (2.05e-05) (2.23e-05) (2.06e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.50e-05) 
Constant -2.979 48.09*** -20.07 44.75** 62.90*** 61.93*** 
 (22.36) (17.50) (21.52) (17.69) (6.813) (7.120) 
       
Observations 1,238 1,300 1,238 1,300 2,538 2,538 
Pseudo R-squared 0.125 0.127 0.130 0.126 0.105 0.101 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 41
Table 7. Results of the Regression Analysis for the Matched sample for the Degree of Ownership in Cross-border acquisitions using composite indices 
(columns 1-4) & two different classification of Ownership: one, Majority Ownership (0/1) analyzed using the Probit model (columns 5-8), and two, Ordered 
Ownership Level (3/2/1) analyzed using the Ordered Probit model (columns 9-12) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES DM EM DM EM (DM) (EM) (DM) (EM) (DM) (EM) (DM) (EM) 
             
Host Human Rights 0.761*** 0.297*           
 (0.265) (0.164)           
Host Human Rights 
(PCA) 
  3.462*** 1.559*         
   (1.280) (0.811)         
Physical integrity 
rights index 
    0.0501* 0.0388**   0.0105 0.0336**   
     (0.0266) (0.0191)   (0.0216) (0.0165)   
Empowerment rights 
index  
      0.0568*** 0.0150   0.0289** 0.0178** 
       (0.0187) (0.0104)   (0.0141) (0.00874) 
Formal institutional 
distance 
-0.245* -0.132 -0.259* -0.136 -0.0109* -0.00368 -0.00657 -0.00254 -0.0123** -0.00283 -0.00900* -0.00178 
 (0.143) (0.100) (0.143) (0.100) (0.00664) (0.00459) (0.00681) (0.00454) (0.00523) (0.00379) (0.00542) (0.00377) 
Deal value 0.0226*** 0.00291*** 0.0227*** 0.00290*** 0.000817*** 0.000178* 0.000787*** 0.000183* 0.000798*** 0.000104 0.000788*** 0.000104 
 (0.00536) (0.00110) (0.00536) (0.00110) (0.000292) (0.000101) (0.000291) (0.000102) (0.000236) (6.60e-05) (0.000236) (6.64e-05) 
Same industry 2.590 2.009 2.633 2.027 0.0791 0.0582 0.0692 0.0539 0.0626 0.0442 0.0543 0.0381 
 (1.919) (1.875) (1.920) (1.876) (0.0890) (0.0879) (0.0890) (0.0877) (0.0736) (0.0728) (0.0738) (0.0727) 
Cash -0.691 2.641 -0.692 2.648 -0.0559 0.0931 -0.0595 0.0897 -0.00135 0.0637 -0.00279 0.0616 
 (1.830) (1.759) (1.830) (1.759) (0.0822) (0.0818) (0.0823) (0.0817) (0.0701) (0.0674) (0.0701) (0.0673) 
Past experience -1.995 3.306* -1.971 3.296* -0.0554 0.0647 -0.0625 0.0646 -0.0717 0.142** -0.0766 0.141** 
 (1.791) (1.780) (1.791) (1.780) (0.0826) (0.0824) (0.0829) (0.0823) (0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0688) (0.0687) 








 (0.0452) (0.0426) (0.0432) (0.0426) (0.00158) (0.00184) (0.00235) (0.00184) (0.00127) (0.00158) (0.00176) (0.00160) 
GDP distance 124.4*** 23.18*** 122.7*** 22.71*** 5.447** 0.806*** 5.462*** 0.926*** 7.198*** 0.851*** 6.386*** 0.913*** 
 (45.96) (5.797) (47.46) (5.837) (2.386) (0.311) (2.002) (0.298) (1.874) (0.246) (1.598) (0.234) 
Minority shareholder 
protection (HOST) 
-1.009 -1.925** -1.175 -1.936** -0.119** -0.113** -0.0597 -0.103** -0.0832** -0.0748** -0.0507 -0.0612* 
 (0.958) (0.913) (0.946) (0.909) (0.0489) (0.0454) (0.0534) (0.0468) (0.0366) (0.0353) (0.0398) (0.0366) 














 (2.24e-05) (2.05e-05) (2.24e-05) (2.05e-05) (1.11e-06) (1.06e-06) (1.12e-06) (1.06e-06) (9.19e-07) (8.78e-07) (9.23e-07) (8.80e-07) 
Constant -10.49 45.37** 3.252 50.57*** -2.001** -0.0264 -2.896*** -0.200     
 (21.38) (17.60) (22.28) (17.70) (0.890) (0.622) (0.875) (0.627)     
Constant cut1         2.068** 0.155 2.358*** 0.324 
         (0.832) (0.656) (0.803) (0.659) 
Constant cut2         2.822*** 0.901 3.114*** 1.069 
         (0.833) (0.656) (0.804) (0.659) 
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Observations 1,238 1,300 1,238 1,300 1,238 1,300 1,238 1,300 1,238 1,300 1,238 1,300 
Pseudo R-squared 0.129 0.127 0.129 0.127         
Robust standard errors in parentheses 













Figure 1. Conceptual framework of host country human rights protection and MNEs’ ownership 
strategy 
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High ownership 
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